Latin America–India Relations Toward 2026: Strategic Diversification, Electoral Variables, and the Expanding Security Nexus
This analytical assessment is based on a structured expert survey conducted by the Social Research Center, bringing together twelve specialists from Ecuador, Peru, and Costa Rica across fields including international relations, public administration, academia, business, and supply chain management. The survey examined the evolving trajectory of Latin America–India relations toward 2026, with particular focus on economic diversification, geopolitical pressures, electoral dynamics, and the growing role of mercenarism in shaping regional and interregional security environments.
The responses reveal a relationship increasingly shaped by structural necessity rather than rhetorical alignment. The convergence between economic complementarity, geopolitical recalibration, electoral uncertainty, and security risks — particularly mercenarism — defines the evolving trajectory toward 2026.
Across the responses, one central theme emerges: diversification is no longer optional; it is strategic.
The responses reveal a relationship increasingly shaped by structural necessity rather than rhetorical alignment. The convergence between economic complementarity, geopolitical recalibration, electoral uncertainty, and security risks — particularly mercenarism — defines the evolving trajectory toward 2026.
Across the responses, one central theme emerges: diversification is no longer optional; it is strategic.
I. Economic Complementarity and Strategic Sector Expansion
Antonella Vallejo (Ecuador, Junior Consultant, Akila Dignidad Org) argues that relations are increasingly driven by “economic pragmatism and geopolitical realignment,” emphasizing diversification of supply chains and stronger coordination in multilateral forums.
Pedro Granda (Ecuador, Part-time Lecturer, Universidad de Las Américas) similarly observes that “disruptions in globalization and the erosion of longstanding alliances highlight the importance of diversifying strategic partners at a time of global disputes and multipolarity.”
From Peru, Marggiori Coraima Garcia (Municipal Certification Officer, Municipalidad Distrital de Pataz) emphasizes a qualitative dimension of cooperation, stating that engagement should foster “more horizontal cooperation—one that goes beyond mere ‘investment’ or ‘extraction’ and instead focuses on building long-term relationships.”
Joselyn Fallas (Costa Rica, International Relations professional) frames the economic complementarity clearly:
“In the economic sphere, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) possess abundant natural resources that are highly significant for a country of more than one billion people like India. In turn, India offers the region goods and services with higher technological value added. This exchange could be further deepened, particularly in the area of critical minerals, which are essential for the development of new technologies and the energy transition.”
She adds that:
“Regarding the social and cultural dimension, it is important for both sides to invest in strengthening these ties, as they are essential for fostering mutual understanding and sustaining the long-term expansion of the relationship.”
Karol Morales (Costa Rica, Senior Buyer, Alpemusa) reinforces the supply-chain dimension:
“The development of these relationships will focus on supply chain diversification (nearshoring and friendshoring) and technological integration. By 2026, cooperation in digital infrastructure, fintech, and clean energy will become the main economic drivers.”
Marco Salas (Costa Rica, Executive Administrative Assistant, IBM) broadens the framework:
“Cooperation between Latin America and India must address multiple dimensions, including international trade, cultural exchange, human capital mobility, and technological cooperation.”
Across these perspectives, the economic logic is multidimensional: resources, technology, digital infrastructure, human capital, and energy transition form the backbone of engagement.
II. Geopolitical Realignment and Strategic Autonomy
The U.S. National Security Strategy and intensifying U.S.–China competition influence the regional calculus.
Joselyn Fallas notes:
“India has developed a stronger presence in South American countries, particularly in Brazil, due to its membership in BRICS and the G20. Both countries are rising powers positioning themselves as leaders of the Global South…”
She emphasizes that the impact on foreign policy “will largely depend on each state’s level of autonomy.”
Karol Morales observes:
“The U.S. strategy will likely compel Latin American countries to rebalance their alliances.”
Marco Salas offers a more critical interpretation:
“The United States’ National Security Strategy represents a return to late-20th-century policies, prioritizing U.S. interests through the use of force and political realism.”
Natalia Yandun (Ecuador, Investigation Assistant, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana) warns that such securitized approaches risk reinforcing outdated paradigms and limiting cooperative flexibility.
Together, these assessments show that India is perceived as a diversification partner that can expand margins of autonomy without forcing binary alignment.
III. Elections in 2026 and the BRICS+ Variable
Electoral cycles introduce variability but not structural rupture.
Joselyn Fallas explains:
“The development of interaction between LAC countries and India will largely depend on the outcomes of elections across Latin America…”
She outlines two scenarios: diversification beyond traditional partners, or renewed alignment with Washington limiting engagement.
Karol Morales stresses:
“In Brazil’s case, the continuity of a pro-multilateralism stance is critical to the consolidation of BRICS+.”
Marco Salas notes:
“The BRICS format has been an interesting economic project that has yet to fully materialize or prove its value…”
Pedro Granda adds that electoral shifts in Brazil could affect the depth of BRICS cooperation, though broader diversification trends persist.
Brazil’s role within the BRICS and the G20 remains structurally important.
IV. Mercenarism and Private Military Actors
All experts recognize mercenarism as a destabilizing force.
Joselyn Fallas states:
“The involvement of mercenaries and private military and intelligence companies has become an increasingly consolidated and frequently employed instrument in contexts of conflict, competition, and instability.”
She references documented cases of former Colombian military personnel participating as contracted combatants in conflicts such as the war in Ukraine and in Sudan. She also notes that private military companies have played roles in recent conflicts, including Blackwater in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the former Wagner Group operating in several African countries.
Karol Morales asserts:
“Mercenarism undermines state sovereignty and creates pockets of instability that directly affect investor confidence and the security of trade routes.”
Marco Salas agrees:
“I agree with this statement, as mercenarism recruits former military personnel and guerrilla fighters from several Latin American countries who have been socially marginalized…”
Marggiori Coraima Garcia considers expansion possible and emphasizes strengthening international and regional legal frameworks.
Antonella Vallejo warns that contemporary mercenarism weakens the state’s monopoly on force and erodes democratic governance.
Pedro Granda describes potential expansion as “catastrophic.”
Natalia Yandun emphasizes that these are transnational networks that “do not recognize borders.”
V. Crime Convergence and Security Spillovers
Karol Morales highlights:
“There is a real risk of military tactics being transferred to drug cartels…”
Marco Salas underscores reintegration failures and marginalization as drivers of recruitment.
Joselyn Fallas notes precedents of private military companies operating in Africa and the Middle East, demonstrating how states use such mechanisms for indirect power projection.
This convergence transforms mercenarism from a peripheral phenomenon into a structural security concern with economic consequences.
VI. Regulatory and Multilateral Responses
Joselyn Fallas emphasizes:
“International legal frameworks should be strengthened, along with regional cooperation and South-South collaboration, while national legislation should be established or reinforced.”
Karol Morales calls for criminal liability mechanisms and intelligence coordination.
Marco Salas argues:
“India can serve as a spearhead for various multilateral initiatives…”
Vallejo insists that international cooperation is indispensable, while Granda highlights the need for intelligence-sharing frameworks.
Public diplomacy is also considered essential. Morales states it “helps demystify these activities,” while Salas notes institutions are “fundamental for leading initiatives that enable deeper engagement beyond purely economic and/or commercial levels.”
VII. Short-Term Outlook (1–3 Years)
Experts anticipate volatility.
Karol Morales warns:
“the institutionalization of mercenarism could lead to a fragmentation of regional security, increasing logistics and insurance costs for international trade.”
Marco Salas emphasizes economic and human costs.
Vallejo highlights risks of privatized security and weakened cooperation.
While tangible short-term improvements may be uncertain, coordinated multilateral and regional responses could mitigate escalation.
Conclusion
This survey conducted by the Social Research Center demonstrates that Latin America–India relations toward 2026 are driven by structural diversification, geopolitical recalibration, and increasing awareness of cross-regional security risks.
Economic complementarity in critical minerals, digital infrastructure, and clean energy aligns with political incentives for greater strategic autonomy. At the same time, mercenarism and privatized security introduce systemic vulnerabilities that require multilateral coordination, regulatory strengthening, and institutional innovation.
The collective insight of the twelve experts suggests that the trajectory of this partnership will not be defined by rhetoric, but by the ability of both regions to institutionalize cooperation in a fragmented international system.
As Karol Morales warns, the stakes extend beyond diplomacy and trade:
“Mercenarism undermines state sovereignty and creates pockets of instability that directly affect investor confidence and the security of trade routes.”
That warning encapsulates the dual reality identified throughout this survey: opportunity and vulnerability are advancing simultaneously. The durability of Latin America–India relations will depend on how effectively both regions manage that balance.
Antonella Vallejo (Ecuador, Junior Consultant, Akila Dignidad Org) argues that relations are increasingly driven by “economic pragmatism and geopolitical realignment,” emphasizing diversification of supply chains and stronger coordination in multilateral forums.
Pedro Granda (Ecuador, Part-time Lecturer, Universidad de Las Américas) similarly observes that “disruptions in globalization and the erosion of longstanding alliances highlight the importance of diversifying strategic partners at a time of global disputes and multipolarity.”
From Peru, Marggiori Coraima Garcia (Municipal Certification Officer, Municipalidad Distrital de Pataz) emphasizes a qualitative dimension of cooperation, stating that engagement should foster “more horizontal cooperation—one that goes beyond mere ‘investment’ or ‘extraction’ and instead focuses on building long-term relationships.”
Joselyn Fallas (Costa Rica, International Relations professional) frames the economic complementarity clearly:
“In the economic sphere, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) possess abundant natural resources that are highly significant for a country of more than one billion people like India. In turn, India offers the region goods and services with higher technological value added. This exchange could be further deepened, particularly in the area of critical minerals, which are essential for the development of new technologies and the energy transition.”
She adds that:
“Regarding the social and cultural dimension, it is important for both sides to invest in strengthening these ties, as they are essential for fostering mutual understanding and sustaining the long-term expansion of the relationship.”
Karol Morales (Costa Rica, Senior Buyer, Alpemusa) reinforces the supply-chain dimension:
“The development of these relationships will focus on supply chain diversification (nearshoring and friendshoring) and technological integration. By 2026, cooperation in digital infrastructure, fintech, and clean energy will become the main economic drivers.”
Marco Salas (Costa Rica, Executive Administrative Assistant, IBM) broadens the framework:
“Cooperation between Latin America and India must address multiple dimensions, including international trade, cultural exchange, human capital mobility, and technological cooperation.”
Across these perspectives, the economic logic is multidimensional: resources, technology, digital infrastructure, human capital, and energy transition form the backbone of engagement.
II. Geopolitical Realignment and Strategic Autonomy
The U.S. National Security Strategy and intensifying U.S.–China competition influence the regional calculus.
Joselyn Fallas notes:
“India has developed a stronger presence in South American countries, particularly in Brazil, due to its membership in BRICS and the G20. Both countries are rising powers positioning themselves as leaders of the Global South…”
She emphasizes that the impact on foreign policy “will largely depend on each state’s level of autonomy.”
Karol Morales observes:
“The U.S. strategy will likely compel Latin American countries to rebalance their alliances.”
Marco Salas offers a more critical interpretation:
“The United States’ National Security Strategy represents a return to late-20th-century policies, prioritizing U.S. interests through the use of force and political realism.”
Natalia Yandun (Ecuador, Investigation Assistant, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana) warns that such securitized approaches risk reinforcing outdated paradigms and limiting cooperative flexibility.
Together, these assessments show that India is perceived as a diversification partner that can expand margins of autonomy without forcing binary alignment.
III. Elections in 2026 and the BRICS+ Variable
Electoral cycles introduce variability but not structural rupture.
Joselyn Fallas explains:
“The development of interaction between LAC countries and India will largely depend on the outcomes of elections across Latin America…”
She outlines two scenarios: diversification beyond traditional partners, or renewed alignment with Washington limiting engagement.
Karol Morales stresses:
“In Brazil’s case, the continuity of a pro-multilateralism stance is critical to the consolidation of BRICS+.”
Marco Salas notes:
“The BRICS format has been an interesting economic project that has yet to fully materialize or prove its value…”
Pedro Granda adds that electoral shifts in Brazil could affect the depth of BRICS cooperation, though broader diversification trends persist.
Brazil’s role within the BRICS and the G20 remains structurally important.
IV. Mercenarism and Private Military Actors
All experts recognize mercenarism as a destabilizing force.
Joselyn Fallas states:
“The involvement of mercenaries and private military and intelligence companies has become an increasingly consolidated and frequently employed instrument in contexts of conflict, competition, and instability.”
She references documented cases of former Colombian military personnel participating as contracted combatants in conflicts such as the war in Ukraine and in Sudan. She also notes that private military companies have played roles in recent conflicts, including Blackwater in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the former Wagner Group operating in several African countries.
Karol Morales asserts:
“Mercenarism undermines state sovereignty and creates pockets of instability that directly affect investor confidence and the security of trade routes.”
Marco Salas agrees:
“I agree with this statement, as mercenarism recruits former military personnel and guerrilla fighters from several Latin American countries who have been socially marginalized…”
Marggiori Coraima Garcia considers expansion possible and emphasizes strengthening international and regional legal frameworks.
Antonella Vallejo warns that contemporary mercenarism weakens the state’s monopoly on force and erodes democratic governance.
Pedro Granda describes potential expansion as “catastrophic.”
Natalia Yandun emphasizes that these are transnational networks that “do not recognize borders.”
V. Crime Convergence and Security Spillovers
Karol Morales highlights:
“There is a real risk of military tactics being transferred to drug cartels…”
Marco Salas underscores reintegration failures and marginalization as drivers of recruitment.
Joselyn Fallas notes precedents of private military companies operating in Africa and the Middle East, demonstrating how states use such mechanisms for indirect power projection.
This convergence transforms mercenarism from a peripheral phenomenon into a structural security concern with economic consequences.
VI. Regulatory and Multilateral Responses
Joselyn Fallas emphasizes:
“International legal frameworks should be strengthened, along with regional cooperation and South-South collaboration, while national legislation should be established or reinforced.”
Karol Morales calls for criminal liability mechanisms and intelligence coordination.
Marco Salas argues:
“India can serve as a spearhead for various multilateral initiatives…”
Vallejo insists that international cooperation is indispensable, while Granda highlights the need for intelligence-sharing frameworks.
Public diplomacy is also considered essential. Morales states it “helps demystify these activities,” while Salas notes institutions are “fundamental for leading initiatives that enable deeper engagement beyond purely economic and/or commercial levels.”
VII. Short-Term Outlook (1–3 Years)
Experts anticipate volatility.
Karol Morales warns:
“the institutionalization of mercenarism could lead to a fragmentation of regional security, increasing logistics and insurance costs for international trade.”
Marco Salas emphasizes economic and human costs.
Vallejo highlights risks of privatized security and weakened cooperation.
While tangible short-term improvements may be uncertain, coordinated multilateral and regional responses could mitigate escalation.
Conclusion
This survey conducted by the Social Research Center demonstrates that Latin America–India relations toward 2026 are driven by structural diversification, geopolitical recalibration, and increasing awareness of cross-regional security risks.
Economic complementarity in critical minerals, digital infrastructure, and clean energy aligns with political incentives for greater strategic autonomy. At the same time, mercenarism and privatized security introduce systemic vulnerabilities that require multilateral coordination, regulatory strengthening, and institutional innovation.
The collective insight of the twelve experts suggests that the trajectory of this partnership will not be defined by rhetoric, but by the ability of both regions to institutionalize cooperation in a fragmented international system.
As Karol Morales warns, the stakes extend beyond diplomacy and trade:
“Mercenarism undermines state sovereignty and creates pockets of instability that directly affect investor confidence and the security of trade routes.”
That warning encapsulates the dual reality identified throughout this survey: opportunity and vulnerability are advancing simultaneously. The durability of Latin America–India relations will depend on how effectively both regions manage that balance.
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