From Transactional Trade to Strategic Partnership
According to Rahul Chaudhary, International Relations Manager at UniAcco (India), relations in 2026 will be “driven by trade and investment, technology collaboration, and multilateral engagement,” with cooperation in IT, renewable energy, and education pushing the relationship beyond purely transactional trade. He notes that the relationship is “expected to shift from transactional trade to strategic, innovation-driven partnerships, addressing shared global challenges.”
This assessment is reinforced by Ratna Pandey, International Relations professional and Content Creator at Hello Angreji (India), who argues that the relationship is now defined by “economic diversification, technology transfer and the shared vision of South-South cooperation.” She emphasizes that amid tariff wars and U.S. policy uncertainty, Latin American countries “look towards India as a non-hegemonic partner,” particularly in manufacturing, lithium processing, biofuels, solar energy, and digital public infrastructure.
Manan Yadav, Research Specialist at Gartner (India), situates this shift within a broader structural transformation, noting that “the consolidation of a more multipolar international order favors stronger South–South cooperation.” He highlights expanding trade in pharmaceuticals, agribusiness, renewable energy, critical minerals, and digital technologies, alongside growing cultural and educational exchanges that foster long-term political trust.
The U.S. National Security Strategy and Strategic Autonomy
The December 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy has emerged as an indirect but significant factor shaping India–Latin America interaction. Chaudhary observes that the Strategy “reinforces the need for India to pursue multilateral and diversified partnerships in the region,” even as it influences regional trade, investment, and security priorities.
Pandey provides a sharper interpretation, arguing that the NSS “fundamentally alters the incentives for Latin Americans on interacting with countries like India.” She notes that while China is framed as a hostile competitor, “India is not termed as hostile,” allowing Latin American states to “secure strategic autonomy avoiding over reliance on China.” At the same time, she cautions that U.S. emphasis on economic security may complicate India’s engagement with lithium-rich countries.
Yadav adds that the Strategy creates “expanded room for maneuver for more autonomous South–South cooperation,” paradoxically encouraging closer India–Latin America ties as an alternative strategic pathway.
Elections, BRICS+, and Political Uncertainty
Electoral outcomes in 2026 are expected to shape the pace and focus of cooperation. Chaudhary notes that pro-market administrations could strengthen trade and technology cooperation, while protectionist governments may slow initiatives. He emphasizes that Brazil’s elections are particularly consequential for the BRICS+ framework.
Pandey argues that a Lula re-election would consolidate BRICS+ as a “Global South advocate,” whereas a conservative shift could deprioritize the bloc in favor of U.S.-led bilateralism, challenging India’s leadership vision.
Yadav similarly highlights Brazil’s strategic weight, noting that a government committed to multilateralism would deepen engagement with India, while a more distant approach could weaken internal coordination without dismantling BRICS+ altogether.
Mercenarism and Emerging Security Risks
On security, expert assessments converge around growing concern. Shilpa S. Joseph, Research Analyst (India), describes mercenarism as evolving into “more organized, transnational, and commercially driven forms,” increasingly linked to illicit economies and private military actors. She warns that this transformation poses “serious risks to regional stability” and complicates governance and humanitarian processes.
Pandey characterizes modern mercenarism as a “corporate proxy model,” where private military companies operate with “plausible deniability,” fueling hybrid warfare, radicalization, and accountability gaps. She stresses that incidents such as the use of mercenaries in Latin America demonstrate how these actors undermine sovereignty and deter long-term investment.
Tripti Neb, Security and International Affairs Analyst (India), underscores that mercenarism now exploits legal gaps across regions, enabling recruitment by transnational criminal organizations and terrorist networks. She emphasizes that without coordinated frameworks, these actors remain unaccountable and continue to threaten regional and global stability.
Conclusion: A Strategic Relationship Under Construction
Taken together, expert perspectives suggest that India–Latin America relations in 2026 are marked less by dramatic realignment than by steady strategic convergence. As Chaudhary notes, the relationship is moving toward “strategic, innovation-driven partnerships.” Yet, as Pandey warns, the interaction is unfolding in an environment where “the privatization of violence undermines democratic accountability,” and where external pressures reshape autonomy.
Ultimately, as Yadav observes, both regions are seeking “to diversify their strategic partnerships, reduce traditional dependencies, and strengthen political coordination.” Whether this convergence matures into a resilient long-term partnership will depend on how effectively governments navigate electoral uncertainty, external power competition, and the growing security risks posed by transnational